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NOTE
ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES AFTER
OIL SPILL DISASTERS: HOW COURTS SHOULD
CONSTRUE THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
UNDER THE OIL POLLUTION ACT
Yen P. Hoangt
The recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico under-
scores the need for those seeking natural resource damages (NRD) to resolve a
critical ambiguity in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA): the legal weight of
the rebuttable presumption of correctness accorded to NRD assessments made
by public trustees. This presumption is available to the trustees if they comply
with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) regu-
lations. No courts, however, have decided what legal weight this presump-
tion carries. NOAA's view is that responsible parties must present both
rebutting evidence and prove that the trustees' NRD determinations are in-
correct. This view is novel and aggressive. Considering, however, Con-
gress's intent to favor trustee NRD recovery, to induce trustees to use certain
assessment methods, and to discourage litigation, NOAA's view is consistent
with the OPA's purposes. When ruling on public trustees' NRD assessments
and determinations, courts should reject the traditional approach and con-
strue the presumption to have greater force than merely shifting the burden of
production. Without this interpretation, a key incentive for parties to engage
in cooperative NRD assessment would be undermined and the opportunity
for prompt and economically-efficient assessment would be lost.
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The recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico-to
date the largest accidental marine spill in historyl-highlights the ne-
cessity to resolve a critical question of statutory interpretation: what is
the legal weight of the rebuttable presumption accorded to natural-
resource damage assessments made by public trustees under the OPA?
How courts construe this term could mean the difference between an
NRD assessment process that is prompt, cooperative, and economi-
cally efficient and one that is more reminiscent of the drawn-out and
bitterly contentious NRD assessment that followed the Exxon Valdez oil
spill of 1989.
History shows that those seeking to recover NRD from oil or
chemical spills often face litigation that can last over a decade. For
example, of the three hundred lawsuits that were filed in 1989 when
the Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
and spilled nearly eleven million gallons of oil,2 many plaintiffs were
still in court through June 15, 2009, trying to recover damages that the
Ninth Circuit had awarded them.3 While oil spills like the Exxon
Valdez affair can result in lengthy litigation for many reasons, one com-
mon cause of delay is that the parties often must undertake costly and
highly complex studies spanning many years to put a dollar value on
natural resource injuries.4 For example, when the United States
sought to recover damages caused by toxic discharges into the Los
Angeles Harbor in United States v. Montrose Chemical Corp.,5 the litiga-
I Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil-spills/gulfofmexico_2010/index.html.
2 See, e.g., ExxON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, LEGACY OF AN OIL SPILL: 2009
STATUS REPORT 4 (2009), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/ (follow "VIEW THE
2009: 20th ANNIVERSARY REPORT" hyperlink).
3 See Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 568 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009); see also
Robert E. Jenkins & Jill Watry Kastner, Case Comment, Running Aground in a Sea of Complex
Litigation: A Case Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 18 UCLAJ. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 151,
153, 167 (2000); Steve Keeva, After the Spill, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 66 (noting that
thousands of plaintiffs filed 181 separate suits in state and federal courts).
4 See VALERIE ANN LEE & PJ. BRIDGEN, THE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
DESKBOOK 339 (2002).
5 The U.S. government initiated a suit for NRD against Montrose Chemical Corpora-
tion of California and other corporate defendants in 1990; the last of the claims did not
settle until 2001. See 104 F.3d 1507, 1511 (9th Cir. 1997); Notice of Lodging of Consent
Decree Pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
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tion lasted eleven years and the responsible parties spent an estimated
$100 million on assessment costs and legal fees. 6 Of the $225 million
of NRD sought, the Government plaintiffs recovered $30 million.7
Furthermore, it took over a decade of legal and scientific wrangling
for the parties to finally reach a settlement, without which meaningful
restoration of the injured natural resources could not begin.8
Recognizing the magnitude of the Exxon Valdez spill and the de-
lays and difficulty that federal and state governments can face in seek-
ing compensation for injuries to natural resources, Congress enacted
the OPA.9 The OPA made the parties responsible for oil spills liable
for those spills' 0 and empowered federal, state, and tribal officials ap-
pointed as public trustees to recover the damages inflicted on the nat-
ural resources under their trusteeship." To facilitate full and prompt
NRD recovery, the OPA directed the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA) to promulgate regulations for NRD
assessments resulting from oil spills.12 Under the OPA, the trustees
must assess damages to the natural resources under their trustee-
ship,'1 and any determination and assessments they make in accor-
dance with such regulations would enjoy "the force and effect of a
rebuttable presumption"' 4 of correctness in a judicial or administra-
tive recovery proceeding.15 Precisely what "force and effect" courts
bility Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 109, 109 (Jan. 2,
2002).
6 LEE & BRIDGEN, supra note 4, at 400.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006); S. REP. No. 101-94, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723 ("What the Nation needs is a package of ... laws that will adequately
compensate victims of oil spills, provide quick, efficient cleanup, [and] minimize damage
to . . . natural resources and internalize those costs within the oil industry . ).
10 See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
11 See id. § 2706(b)(1).
12 Id. § 2706(e) (1); see Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 770
(D.C. Cir. 1997); see aso, e.g., 135 CONG. REc. S9689 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (detailing
Senate debate on the OPA).
13 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(1)(A)-(C).
14 Id. § 2706(e) (2).
15 Congress modeled these OPA provisions after the NRD provisions under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Under
CERCLA, parties responsible for the release of a hazardous substance are liable for NRD
resulting from such a release. See 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(C). Acting as public trustees,
state and federal officials are empowered to recover compensation for NRD resulting from
a hazardous release. See id. § 9607(f) (2) (A)-(B). CERCLA requires the President to pro-
mulgate regulations for NRD assessment. See id. § 9651(c). The President has delegated
this authority to the Department of Interior (DOI). See Exec. Order No. 12580, 52 Fed.
Reg. 2923 (Jan. 29, 1987), amended by Exec. Order No. 13016, 61 Fed. Reg. 45871 (Aug. 30,
1996). As under section 1006(e)(2) of the OPA, section 107(f)(2)(C) of CERLCA pro-
vides that a damages assessment conducted by a trustee in accordance with the DOI regula-
tions has "the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption ... in any administrative or
judicial proceeding under [CERCLA]." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2) (C). Trustee compliance
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should give this presumption, particularly in light of Congress's policy
goals for the OPA, remains unresolved.
Seeking to effectuate the OPA's goal of minimizing the costs,
contention, and delays like those that accompanied the Exxon Valdez
affair, NOAA promulgated a set of assessment regulations it calls col-
lectively the "Final Rule."16 The Final Rule sets out an administrative
framework known as "cooperative assessment," which generally "refers
to activities conducted by [potentially responsible parties] and trust-
ees in a collaborative context to assess injury and . . . damages with a
focus on achieving 'early' restoration and resolution of liability with-
out litigation."17  One mandatory cooperative-assessment activity
under the Final Rule, for example, is that trustees must give responsi-
ble parties the opportunity to participate in the assessments they con-
duct prior to bringing an NRD recovery claim under the OPA.18
Although NOAA "delineates a set process for conducting assess-
ments" under the Final Rule, the Agency has also, "in light of the myr-
iad of facts and circumstances unique to each oil spill [,] ... decided
to allow [trustees] the discretion to decide, on a case-by-case basis,
which specific assessment procedures or methodologies are most ap-
propriate in a given setting."19 That is, compliance with the Final
Rule is not mandatory for trustees.20 If, for example, the trustees de-
cide to pursue an assessment procedure that deviates from the coop-
erative-assessment procedure specified in the Final Rule, their ability
to bring an NRD claim under section 1002(a) of the OPA is not af-
with the DOI assessment regulations is voluntary; noncompliance does not affect recover-
ability. See 43 C.F.R § 11.10 (2010). However, any assessment that is not done pursuant to
the DOI assessment regulations will not enjoy the CERCLA rebuttable presumption. See42
U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C); 43 C.F.R. § 11.10. Thus, given the similarity in the statutory lan-
guage and structure of the CERCLA and OPA NRD provisions, it is reasonable to draw
general comparisons, for the purpose of analyzing the OPA rebuttable presumption, to
academic works and case law on the CERCLA NRD provisions and particularly the CER-
CLA rebuttable presumption. It is important to note, however, that the legislative motiva-
tions behind the two statutes and their implementing regulations are not the same, and as
such, the comparison is limited.
16 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 443 (Jan. 5, 1996) (codi-
fied at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
17 LEE & BRIDGEN, supra note 4, at 401-02; see 15 C.F.R. § 990.41-990.45 (2009).
18 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.14(c)(1), 990.45(d).
19 Brief for Respondent at 23, General Electric v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 128
F.3d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1096), 1997 WL 34647675. NOAA takes the view that
this decision is within the broad rulemaking authority given to it by Congress in section
1006(e) (1) of the OPA. Particularly, NOAA argues that the OPA requires only that it pro-
mulgate regulations for the assessment of NRD and does not specify how it should ap-
proach its task or what specific procedures such regulations must contain. See id. at 32.
20 15 C.F.R. § 990.11 ("This part may be used by these officials in conducting natural
resource damage assessments when natural resources and/or services are injured as a re-
sult of an incident involving . .. a discharge of oil. This part is not intended to affect the
recoverability of natural resource damages when recoveries are sought other than in accor-
dance with this part.").
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fected; the only consequence is that they would lose whatever advan-
tage the rebuttable presumption provided under section 1006(e)
might confer.21 For the purposes of this Note, I assume that this posi-
tion is correct.2 2
It follows, then, that the OPA's incentive structure for trustees to
undertake NOAA's cooperative-assessment procedure critically rests
on whatever practical advantages the rebuttable presumption might
confer on the correctness of their NRD assessments and determina-
tions. Moreover, what legal weight this presumption might carry has
practical implications for the trustees and responsible parties as they
craft their litigation strategy. Unfortunately, neither the language nor
legislative history of the OPA has explicated the specific legal weight
of the OPA rebuttable presumption. Some guidance exists, however,
in NOAA's regulations. In the preamble of the Final Rule, NOAA "in-
terprets" the OPA rebuttable presumption "to mean that the responsi-
ble parties have the burdens of presenting alternative evidence on
damages and of persuading the fact finder that the damages
presented by the trustees are not an appropriate measure of
damages."23
In this Note, I survey and discuss potential theories of what bur-
den-shifting effects the OPA rebuttable presumption might have, con-
sider its legislative history and policy goals, and conclude by proposing
that courts adopt NOAA's interpretation. In Part I, I describe the ma-
jor goals of the OPA and its NRD provision. I then describe NOAA's
regulations for NRD assessment, focusing on the cooperative-assess-
ment procedure with which trustees must comply to benefit from the
OPA rebuttable presumption. In Part II, I review the doctrinal back-
ground of rebuttable presumptions, setting out two leading views on
what burden-shifting effects rebuttable presumptions have-the
"bursting-bubble" theory and the Morgan-McCormick theory. I then
discuss Federal Rule of Evidence 301 (FRE 301) and observe that it
adopts a third "intermediate" approach to explaining the effects of
rebuttable presumptions. In this Part, I also discuss current views on
the burden-shifting effects of the OPA rebuttable presumption and
note that the interpretation NOAA has adopted mirrors the Morgan-
McCormick theory.
21 See id. § 990.13 (asserting that only an assessment made in accordance with this
section "shall have the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption").
22 The DOI has also explicitly stated that its assessment regulations under CERCLA,
after which the NOAA assessment regulations are modeled, are voluntary and that non-
compliance would not disqualify trustees from bringing a suit for NRD under CERCLA. See
43 C.F.R. § 11.10; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 32.
23 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 443 (Jan. 5, 1996) (codi-
fied at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
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Using a hypothetical, I explore in Part IV how the bursting-bub-
ble, Morgan-McCormick, and the FRE 301 approaches might apply to
the OPA rebuttable presumption. I observe in Part IV that the burst-
ing-bubble theory and FRE 301, if applicable, would significantly limit
the OPA rebuttable presumption's potential force and effect. Then
upon examining the legislative history of the OPA, I suggest in Part V
that Congress adopted the OPA rebuttable presumption to favor trust-
ees' recovery of NRD, to incentivize the use of accurate assessment
methods, and to discourage costly litigation through compliance with
NOAA's cooperative assessment procedures. In light of these statu-
tory purposes, I argue in Part VI that courts should adopt NOAA's
interpretation, which effectuates the full force and effect of the OPA
rebuttable presumption, because this interpretation is reasonable and
consistent with the presumption's statutory purposes. Reinforcing
this argument, I discuss in Part VII why courts should find that FRE
301 does not govern the effects of the OPA rebuttable presumption-
because the presumption falls under the Rule's "Act of Congress" ex-
ception, and because such a reading would significantly limit the func-
tions that Congress had intended the presumption to accomplish.
I.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill of March 1989, Congress
enacted the OPA as a comprehensive scheme to consolidate and im-
prove existing federal laws that address liability for hazardous releases,
such as the CERCLA and the Clean Water Act. The goal of the OPA is
to prevent future oil spills and to "make the environment and public
whole" for resulting injuries to natural resources. 24 Using restoration
costs instead of market value as the metric for measuring injuries to
natural resources, the OPA's focus is to facilitate prompt restoration.25
To these ends, Title I of the OPA creates a comprehensive liability and
compensation scheme for oil spills. In particular, section 1006(a) pro-
24 See id. at 440. See also S. REP. No. 101-94, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
722, 723 ("What the Nation needs is a package of ... laws that will adequately compensate
victims of oil spills, provide quick, efficient clean up, minimize damage to fisheries, wildlife
and other natural resources and internalize those costs within the oil industry and its trans-
portation sector."); 136 CONG. REc. H6935 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Jones) (" [This bill makes] it easier for victims of oil spills to recover for economic damages,
natural resource damages, subsistence loss, and others. They can seek reimbursement
from the spiller or directly from the $1 billion Federal trust fund. The 1978 Amoco Cadiz
spill off the coast of France was the biggest spill in history to come ashore. The litigation
on that spill is still going on after 12 years, and not one penny in damages has yet been
paid. This bill will make sure that doesn't happen here.").
25 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. at 440.
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vides for recovery by the federal government, states, tribes, and private
parties that respond to oil spills. 2 6 It also created a $1 billion Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund to which trustees can turn for funding to restore
natural resources injured by oil spills.2 7 The trustees must, however,
first seek damages from the responsible parties.28
B. Natural Resource Damage Assessment Under the OPA
Under section 1006(e) of the OPA, Congress requires the Presi-
dent through the undersecretary for oceans and atmosphere to pro-
mulgate regulations for the assessment of natural resource injuries
resulting from oil spills. 29 In January 1996, NOAA issued the Final
Rule to this effect, setting out a process for NRD assessment and for
developing plans to restore injured natural resources.30 The NRD as-
sessment process as established by the Final Rule consists of three
phases: (1) preassessment; (2) restoration planning; and (3) restora-
tion implementation.31 In the preassessment phase, trustees must
among other things collect and analyze pertinent data, prepare a No-
tice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning, and open a publicly
available administrative record.3 2 In the restoration planning phase,
trustees must determine whether natural resource injuries have oc-
curred and quantify the nature and extent of such injuries.33 If trust-
ees determine that restoration activities are necessary, they must
identify a "reasonable range" of restoration alternatives and then de-
velop a Draft Restoration Plan.3 4 After public review and incorpora-
tion of public comments, the Draft Restoration Plan becomes the
Final Restoration Plan.3 5 At the conclusion of the restoration plan-
ning phase, the trustees present a written demand to the responsible
parties, requesting either implementation of the Final Restoration
Plan or damage payment based on their assessments. 36 If the respon-
sible parties refuse to meet this demand and if neither side can agree
26 See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2006).
27 See LEE & BRIDGEN, supra note 4, at 111. Congress established the Fund as a source
of money to pay removal and other costs and damages resulting from oil spills. It is "used
for costs not directly paid by a responsible party or guarantor, including costs to respond to
spills for which there is no identified responsible party." Id.
28 See 15 C.F.R. § 9 90.64(a) (2010); LEE & BRIDGEN, supra note 4, at 111.
29 See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e) (1).
30 15 C.F.R. § 990.12 (giving an overview of the three phases of NRD assessment set
forth); Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. at 444.
31 See 15 C.F.R. § 990.12.
32 See id. §§ 990.41-990.45.
33 See id. §§ 990.51 (a)-(b), 990.52(a)-(b).
34 See id. §§ 990.54(a), 990.55(b).
35 See id. § 990.55(a), (d).
36 See id. § 990.62(b).
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on an alternative amount, the trustees may sue the responsible parties
for the amount assessed.37
C. NOAA's Cooperative-Assessment Procedure
NOAA's Final Rule aims to promote the OPA's goal of expedi-
tious and cost-effective restoration of injured natural resources and
services.3 8 To this end, the regulation sets forth an administrative pro-
cedure known as cooperative assessment, which enables trustees to in-
volve interested responsible parties in assessment activities
undertaken during the restoration planning phase.3 9 NOAA reasons
that such cooperative assessments can avoid duplicate studies and pro-
mote overall efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 40 Furthermore, assess-
ments made with inputs from the public and the participation of
responsible parties will help achieve NOAA's three major goals: vali-
dating trustee damage determinations, ensuring that trustees follow
appropriate assessment procedures, and reducing transaction costs.4'
NOAA nevertheless recognizes that cooperative assessment risks com-
promising the trustees' statutory obligations to act on behalf of the
public trust by potentially creating the opportunity for responsible
parties to interfere with or delay trustees' assessment activities. 42 This
cooperative-assessment procedure is described below.
Invitation. First, the trustees must invite responsible parties in
writing to participate in the NRD assessment process as soon as practi-
cable but no later than delivery of the Notice of Intent to Conduct
Restoration Planning.43
Scope of Responsible Parties' Participation. If the responsible parties
agree to participate in the assessment process, trustees must deter-
mine the extent of their participation. At a minimum, the responsible
parties' participation must include the opportunity to comment on
documents or plans that significantly affect the nature and extent of
the assessment; the trustees' objective consideration of all written
comments, recommendations, or proposals that the responsible par-
ties submitted; and notice of the trustees' determinations under the
regulation.44
37 See id. § 990.64(a).
38 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 440 (Jan. 5, 1996)
(codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990) ("The goal of the [OPA] is to make the environment and
public whole for injuries to natural resources and natural resource services . . . .").
39 See id. at 443 ("[T]he rule requires the trustees to invite the responsible parties to
participate in the assessment.").
40 See id.
41 See id. at 441.
42 See id. at 443 (outlining factors the trustees may use to determine the appropriate
scope of participation by responsible parties).
43 See 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c) (1)-(2) (2010).
44 See id. § 990.14(c) (4).
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Agreement. Beyond the minimal participation requirements, the
Final Rule also encourages, but does not require, trustees and partici-
pating responsible parties to "develop a set of agreed-upon facts con-
cerning the incident and/or assessment."45 Stipulated facts might, for
example, specify the types of injured natural resources and services,
the extent of injury, the most appropriate assessment procedures to
determine injury, and how to interpret the results of the chosen pro-
cedures. 46 Also, the parties have the option of entering into binding
agreements to facilitate their interactions.4 7
Proposals for Alternative Assessment Methods. Responsible parties
may request the use of assessment methods other than those selected
by the trustees if those methods meet the conditions in part 990, sec-
tion 14(c) (6) (i) of the Final Rule, if the parties agree not to challenge
the results of the requested alternate procedure, and if the parties
agree to fund the alternate procedure.48 Trustees can reject such pro-
posals if, in the sole judgment of the trustees, the proposals are either
not feasible or scientifically or technically sound, or if they would not
adequately address the appropriate natural resources and services.4 9
Trustees must document the request and their response in the admin-
istrative record.50
Termination of Participation and Disclosure. Trustees may end par-
ticipation by responsible parties who interfere with their ability to ful-
fill responsibilities under the OPA and the Final Rule during the
assessment process.5 1
Public Review. Finally, trustees must provide opportunities for
public involvement after they make the decision to develop restora-
tion plans or issue related notices.52 Trustees may also allow public
involvement at any time prior to this decision if it could enhance the
trustees' decision making or help to avoid delays in restoration.53
D. Compliance with the NOAA's NRD Assessment Procedure
Entitles Trustees to a Rebuttable Presumption
As described above, the Final Rule provides a process for con-
ducting NRD assessments, including specific determinations and their
sequence, as well as the trustees' obligation to document their choices
and to provide an opportunity for public and responsible-party input.
45 See id. § 990.14(c) (3).
46 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. at 443.
47 See id.
48 See 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c) (6) (i).
49 See id. § 990.14(c) (6) (ii).
50 See id. § 990.14(c) (7).
51 See id.




Furthermore, it sets a standard for NRD assessments, requiring that
they be "capable of providing assessment information of use in deter-
mining the type and scale of restoration appropriate for a particular
injury," and "reliable and valid for the particular incident" in order
for trustees to recover from responsible parties. 54 The Final Rule,
however, does not require any specific assessment procedures or
methodologies.55 Trustees have the discretion to decide, on a case-by-
case basis, what particular assessment procedures to use in a given set-
ting.5 6 However, any determination or assessment of damages made in
accordance with the Final Rule that NOAA promulgated has "the
force and effect of a rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trustee
in any administrative or judicial proceeding."57 Conversely, noncom-
pliance disqualifies the trustees from availing themselves of the rebut-
table presumption5 8 but otherwise does not affect their ability to
collect damages.59
E. The Rebuttable Presumption Is Triggered When Trustees
Meet Their Burden of Production
Once the trustees have completed their NRD assessment and
presented a written demand to the responsible parties requesting ei-
ther implementation of the Restoration Plan or a payment, the trust-
ees may take their claim to court if the responsible parties refuse to
meet the demand or if neither side can agree on an alternative
amount.6 0 In their case-in-chief, the trustees can rest after producing
evidence to establish the responsible parties' liability and after intro-
ducing their damage assessment and demonstrating that it had been
conducted in accordance with the Final Rule. The OPA rebuttable
presumption is triggered at that point, and the burden shifts to the
responsible parties to produce evidence rebutting either the trustees'
claim that the assessment had been conducted in accordance with the
Final Rule or the trustees' NRD determinations. 61 After this burden-
54 See id. § 990.27(a), (a) (3); accord Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128
F.3d 767, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
55 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 23-24 and accompanying text.
56 See id.
57 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e) (2) (2006); 15 C.F.R. § 990.13.
58 Oil Pollution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 1006(e)(2) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 2706(e) (2) (2006)); Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 444 (Jan.
5, 1996) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990) ("If natural resources and/or services are injured by
a discharge or release of a mixture of oil and hazardous substances, trustees must use 43
CFR part 11 in order to obtain a rebuttable presumption.").
59 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. at 442 ("The process de-
scribed in the rule is not intended to affect the recoverability of natural resource damages
when recoveries are sought other than in accordance with this rule.").
60 See 15 C.F.R. § 990.64(a).
61 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. at 443 ("NOAA interprets
this presumption to mean that the responsible parties have the burdens of presenting al-
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Before delving into the potential effects of the OPA rebuttable
presumption, I first discuss the definition, functions, and potential
burden-shifting effects of rebuttable presumptions in general.
A. What Is a Rebuttable Presumption?
A rebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence under which, once
a basic fact or a group of basic facts (Fact[s] A) have been established,
the fact finder also must accept the presumed fact (Fact B) that fol-
lows from the basic fact unless the presumption is rebutted.62 A rebut-
table presumption is different from an inference. In an inference,
"the existence of Fact B may be deduced from Fact A by the ordinary
rules of reasoning and logic."6 3 In a rebuttable presumption, how-
ever, "the existence of Fact B must be assumed because of a rule of
law. "64
B. What Functions Do Rebuttable Presumptions Serve?
Relying on common-law doctrines, courts traditionally use rebut-
table presumptions in jury trials to reallocate power between the
judge and the jury.65 Usually, the effect of a common-law rebuttable
presumption is "getting the claim to the jury more rapidly and under
more favorable jury instructions than would otherwise be the case." 66
This serves the judicial policy of reducing the power of judges in de-
ciding factual controversies. 67
ternative evidence on damages and of persuading the fact finder that the damages
presented by the trustees are not an appropriate measure of damages.").
62 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 301.02[1] (2d ed. 2000); see Take v. Comm'r, 804 F.2d 553, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1986).
3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 62 ("For example, in most jurisdictions the tort
rule of res ipsa loquitur provides that if certain basic facts are proven, ajury may-but need
not-find negligence. It is an inference (permissive), not a presumption (mandatory).");
see also Cnty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (asserting that the permissive infer-
ence, or presumption, allows but does not require the trier of fact to infer the elemental
fact from the proof of the basic fact and does not place a burden on the defendant).
64 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 62.
65 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 5122.1, at 439 (2d ed. 2005).
66 Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C.
ENvL. Ave. L. REV. 405, 437 (1989).
67 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 65, § 5122.2, at 449 ("The underlying policy
increases the power of the jury to decide facts by restricting the powers of judges to take
cases away from the verdict [sic] by the use of directed verdicts . . . .").
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Rebuttable presumptions do more than reallocate judge and jury
power, however.68 Indeed, legislative bodies are "free to adopt pre-
sumptions for policy reasons."69 Such reasons might be to "correct
the imbalance resulting from one party's superior access to the evi-
dence, to facilitate the prompt resolution of claims, and to favor cer-
tain claims for social and economic reasons."7 0  As Frederick
Anderson observed, whereas common law conceptions might "act as a
brake" upon recovery for certain claims,71 legislatures have
maneuvered around such constraints by employing statutory rebutta-
ble presumptions to achieve their objectives of favoring recovery for
such claims.7 2
C. What Are the Potential Burden-Shifting Effects of a
Rebuttable Presumption?
A rebuttable presumption "has the effect of shifting the burden
of proof."73 There are, however, two aspects of the burden of proof:
(1) the burden of production and (2) the burden of persuasion. The
burden of production-that is, the burden of coming forward with
the evidence-determines whether a case reaches thejury.74 The bur-
den of persuasion refers to the degree to which a party must prove to
the jury each element of the case.75 As a result, a rebuttable presump-
tion can either shift only the burden of production or both the bur-
den of production and burden of persuasion.76 There is substantial
disagreement, generally falling into three distinct views, as to which of
these effects a given rebuttable presumption may have. A discussion
of these views follows below.
1. Bursting Bubble
The bursting-bubble approach holds that a rebuttable presump-
tion only shifts the burden of production so that one's opponent need
68 See Anderson, supra note 66, at 438 ("Modern legislative burden shifting has served
not only to reallocate power between judge and jury but to move well beyond the strictures
of causal proof which the common law requires.").
69 Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Dep't of Transp., 105 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
70 Anderson, supra note 66, at 436.
71 See id. at 427.
72 See id. at 439-40 (discussing how state worker compensation laws and federal social
welfare legislation, such as the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, have accorded
generous presumptions of correctness to favor compensation for victims of black-lung
disease).
73 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932).
74 See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 336, at 783-84 & n.3 (2d ed. 1972) ("One burden is
that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particular fact in issue . . . .").
75 See id. § 336, at 783-84 ("The burden of persuasion becomes a crucial factor only if
the parties have sustained their burdens of producing evidence.").
76 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 62.
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only bring forward enough rebutting evidence to avoid a directed ver-
dict.7 7 It does not shift the burden of persuasion. Under the burst-
ing-bubble theory, the rebuttable presumption merely serves
procedural convenience and "bursts" upon the presentation of rebut-
ting evidence-leaving the court to decide the case as if the presump-
tion never existed.78 Thus, a court applying the bursting-bubble
approach will, upon sufficient rebutting evidence, require the propo-
nent of a rebuttable presumption to put on further evidence of the
presumed fact; otherwise, the opponent is entitled to a directed ver-
dict on that issue.79
2. Morgan-McCormick
The Morgan-McCormick approach emphasizes that rebuttable
presumptions are usually created for substantive policy reasons, not
merely for procedural convenience. 0 Under the Morgan-McCormick
approach, a rebuttable presumption has great weight and would ei-
ther (a) shift not only the burden of production but also the burden
of persuasion or (b) require the court to inform the jury that the pre-
sumption exists and to instruct the jury that it can find contrary to the
rebutting evidence.81 Thus, even if rebutting evidence is introduced,
the rebuttable presumption does not burst.82 The issue would go to
the jury and the judge would instruct the jury about the existence of
the presumption. Therefore, unless the opponent of the presump-
tion persuades the fact finder of the nonexistence of the presumed fact,
the fact finder must accept the presumed fact as true.8 3
3. Federal Rules of Evidence
FRE 301 provides:
77 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 65, § 5126, at 550 (stating that under the "burst-
ing bubble" theory, contrary evidence "destroy[s] the presumption"); see asoJAMEs BRAD-
LEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 339 (Boston, Little,
Brown, & Co. 1898) (asserting that the purpose of a presumption is to place the burden of
going forward with evidence on the party the presumption operates against).
78 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 65, § 5126, at 550; see also Nunley v. City of L.A.,
52 F.3d 792, 795-96 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the common-law mailbox presump-
tion and stating that "[u] nder the so-called 'bursting bubble' approach to presumptions, a
presumption disappears where rebuttal evidence is presented").
79 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 62 § 301 app. 100[2] (a).
80 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 65, § 5126, at 540; see also Edmund M. Morgan,
Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof 47 HARv. L. REV. 59, 82 (1933)
(rejecting the bursting-bubble theory and noting that "it is little short of ridiculous to allow
so valuable a presumption to be destroyed by the introduction of evidence without actual
persuasive effect").
81 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 65, at 430-31.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 431 (noting that upon contrary evidence the judge will send "the case to
the jury with an instruction that the burden of persuasion is on the opponent").
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In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to
such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-per-
suasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast.84
Where FRE 301 applies, a presumption, while shifting only the burden
of production, "does not vanish upon the introduction of contra-
dicting evidence, and does not change the burden of persuasion; in-
stead [it] is merely deemed sufficient evidence of the fact presumed
to be considered by the jury or other finder of fact."85 In other words,
"the court cannot instruct the jury that it may presume the existence
of the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts. The court may,
however, instruct the jury that it may infer the existence of the pre-
sumed fact from proof of the basic facts."8 6 Unlike the Morgan-Mc-
Cormick approach, FRE 301 in effect provides that it is discretionary
and not mandatory for ajudge to instruct the jury on the existence of
the presumption.8 7
4. FRE 301 Does Not Endorse the Bursting-Bubble Approach
Courts have asserted that FRE 301 is similar to the bursting-bub-
ble approach in its treatment of presumptions.8 8 Most of these cases
can be distinguished in that they deal with common-law presumptions
or administratively-created presumptions where FRE 301 definitely ap-
plies.8 9 Statutory presumptions such as the OPA rebuttable presump-
tion, in contrast, are not necessarily governed by FRE 301.90
84 FED. R. EVID. 301.
85 See id. and accompanying committee reports; Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence Before the Subcommittee on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary
(Supp.), 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 364 (Comm. Print 1973); Notes of Committee on
the judiciary, H. Rep. No. 93-650; see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
659-60 (1989) ("[T]o the extent that [prior] cases speak of an employer's 'burden of
proof with respect to a legitimate business justification defense, they should have been
understood to mean an employer's production-but not persuasion-burden." (citation
omitted)).
86 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 65, at 344 (emphasis added) (quoting the Confer-
ence Comm. Rep. on FRE Rule 301).
87 See id.
88 See Nunley v. City of L.A., 52 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that FRE
301 adopts the bursting-bubble approach with regard to the common-law mailbox pre-
sumption); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 74, § 345, at 821 (asserting that the bursting-
bubble theory is "the most widely followed theory of presumptions in American law"); see
generally Bratton v. Yoder Co. (In reYoder Co.), 758 F.2d 1114, 1119 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Most
commentators have concluded that Rule 301 as enacted embodies the Thayer or 'bursting
bubble' approach.").
89 See, e.g., Nunley, 52 F.3d at 793 (noting that the case concerns an issue of first im-
pression regarding FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6)).
90 See infra Part VI.C.
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Legislative history does not support the idea that Congress en-
dorsed the bursting-bubble approach in enacting FRE 301. The
House Judiciary Committee, in its report on FRE 301, found that the
bursting-bubble approach gives presumptions "too slight an effect."9'
On the other hand, the Committee also rejected the Morgan-McCor-
mick view, finding that it "lends too great a force to presumptions."92
Accordingly, the best view is that FRE 301 endorses an "intermediate"
approach to presumptions because it contains elements of both the
bursting-bubble approach and the Morgan-McCormick approach.93
Courts following the "intermediate" approach recognize that allowing
a statutory presumption to disappear from a case under the bursting-
bubble approach merely because a party presents some conflicting evi-
dence "could undercut the legislative purpose in creating the
presumption." 94
III.
CURRENT VIEWS ON THE LEGAL WEIGHT OF THE OPA
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
A. Statutory Language and NOAA's Interpretation
While section 1006(e) (2) of the OPA accords "the force and ef-
fect of a rebuttable presumption" to any trustee determination and
assessment of damages made in accordance with the Final Rule,
neither the Act nor its legislative history explicates the legal weight of
this rebuttable presumption.
In the preamble of the Final Rule, NOAA "interprets" the OPA
rebuttable presumption "to mean that the responsible parties have
the burdens of presenting alternative evidence on damages and of
persuading the fact finder that the damages presented by the trustees
are not an appropriate measure of damages."95 In NOAA's view, then,
91 See Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H. REP. No. 93-650 (1973).
92 See id.
93 See id.; United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 382-83 (1st Cir. 1985).
94 Jessup, 757 F.2d at 383 (applying the "intermediate" approach to determine the
burden-shifting effect of a rebuttable presumption under the Bail Reform Act and citing
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 65, § 5122, at 566, for the proposition that "while courts pay
'lip service' to 'bursting bubble' [sic] approach, 'most of them [have] felt compelled to
deviate from the 'bursting bubble' theory at one time or another in order to give greater
effect to presumptions" (alteration in original)); see also Wright v. State Accident Ins. Fund,
613 P.2d 755, 759-60 (Or. 1980) ("If there is opposing evidence, the trier of fact must
weigh the evidence, giving the presumption the value of evidence, and determine upon
which side the evidence preponderates."); Montgomery Cnty. Fire Bd. v. Fisher, 454 A.2d
394, 400 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (finding that the statutory presumption that a
firefighter's heart disease is job related "does not disappear like the bursting bubble upon
generation of a jury issue; rather it remains in the case as one of the elements to be
considered").
95 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 443 (Jan. 5, 1996) (codi-
fied at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
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the rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion to the responsible parties once the trustees
demonstrate that their NRD assessment procedure complies with the
Final Rule.
B. Relevant Case Law
Courts have given the burden-shifting effects of the OPA rebutta-
ble presumptions some but not much attention. In General Electric Co.
v. U.S. Department of Commerce, the D.C. Circuit noted NOAA's coun-
sel's description of the OPA rebuttable presumption as a "burden
shifting exercise" and observed that the presumption did not appear
to confer a "powerful advantage" to trustees as the opposing counsel
had argued that it would.9 6 The court, however, also ruled that it did
not need to resolve the question of what legal weight this presumption
carries.97 Thus, other than some preliminary treatment, there has
been limited detailed explanation of how and on what grounds a
court would interpret the OPA rebuttable presumption. I suggest in
Part V that future courts should be mindful of the presumption's stat-
utory goals in performing this task.
As noted, section 107(f) (2) (C) of CERCLA accords a virtually
identical rebuttable presumption to trustees' NRD assessment and de-
terminations."8 Courts also have not, however, resolved the burden-
shifting effects of the CERCLA rebuttable presumption. In Ohio v.
U.S. Department of the Interior, the court described the CERCLA rebutta-
ble presumption for NRD assessment and determination as a "pre-
sumption of correctness" but did not address its burden-shifting
effects.99 In United States v. Asarco Inc., the court discussed the scope
of the CERCLA rebuttable presumption to determine whether it af-
fected all or only final NRD determinations; however, it, too, did not
address the presumption's burden-shifting effects.100
C. Recent Scholarship
After considering the OPA rebuttable presumption in light of the
bursting-bubble approach, the Morgan-McCormick approach, and
FRE 301, some commentators have predicted that its only effect is
shifting the burden of production from the trustee to the responsible
party.' 0 This view presupposes that the traditional common-law
96 Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
97 See id.
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2) (C) (2006).
99 See 880 F.2d 432, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
100 See Nos. 96-cv-0122, 91-cv-342, 1998 WL 1799392, at *2-3 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 1998).
101 See, e.g., Craig R. O'Connor, Natural Resource Damage Actions Under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990: A Litigation Perspective, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 441, 450-53 (1993) ("The trustee
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norms for rebuttable presumptions would continue to govern when
courts seek to determine the effects of the OPA rebuttable presump-
tion. Legislation such as CERCLA, the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, and the Black Lung Benefits Act remind us, how-
ever, that Congress has on multiple occasions relaxed common-law
standards of proof and procedure to favor certain compensatory and
remedial outcomes for the litigants it sought to benefit.102 Thus, in
light of the goals of these statutes, the analysis supporting the com-
mon-law view of the presumption is incomplete without further discus-
sion of the OPA's statutory scheme, Congress's goals for the OPA's
rebuttable presumption, and the potential reasons why courts should
treat the OPA rebuttable presumption as they would any other ordi-
nary common-law rebuttable presumption.
Commentators have, in contrast, explored the potential burden-
shifting effects of the analogous CERLCA rebuttable presumption.10 3
Indeed, while there is arguably no final word on the issue, Mark Men-
efee and others have argued that the CERCLA rebuttable presump-
tion likely has little evidentiary value because it would, assuming that
FRE 301 applies, shift only the burden of producing evidence to the
responsible party but not the burden of persuasion. 1 0 4 On the other
hand, in positing that Congress adopted the CERCLA rebuttable pre-
sumption to "give the trustees a better chance of prevailing in cases
involving difficult-to-prove ecological damage,"10 5 Anderson has laid
the foundation for my argument in Part V that, considering the OPA's
legislative history and policy goals, courts should interpret the OPA
need only prove that it conducted the damage assessment in accordance with the natural
resource damages regulations to establish a prima facie case . . . . The burden of proof
then shifts to the responsible party to rebut the presumption and prevail in the battle of
persuasion."); Danielle Marie Stager, Note, From Kepone to Exxon Valdez Oil and Beyond: An
Overview of Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 29 U. RiCH. L. REV. 751, 762 (1995) (arguing
that if the trustees follow the regulatory guidelines in their assessment, the responsible
parties must then show "errors or unreliability in assessment and valuation methods").
102 See Anderson, supra note 66, at 421-26 & nn.71-72 (discussing compensatory and
remedial federal legislation where Congress "deliberately" altered and thus supplanted
traditional common-law standards of fault and causation to facilitate recovery).
103 The language of this presumption is virtually identical to that of the OPA. See dis-
cussion infra Part IV.A.2.
104 See Mark Menefee, Recovery for Natural Resource Damages Under Superfund: The Role of
the Rebuttable Presumption, 12 ENvrL. L. REP. 15,057, 15,061-64 (1982) (asserting that if the
government chooses to litigate in federal court, FRE 301 would apply and once the oppo-
nent produces rebutting evidence, the issue becomes an issue of fact and goes to the jury);
accord Duane Woodard & Michael R. Hope, Natural Resource Damage Litigation Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REv. 189, 210-11 (1990) (citing Menefee and noting that, under FRE 301, the plaintiff
retains the burden of proof throughout the trial).
105 Anderson, supra note 66; see also David Elbaum, Judicial Review of Natural Resource
Damage Assessments under CERCLA: Implications of the Right to Trial by Jury, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv.
352, 386 (1995) (arguing that Congress enacted the rebuttable presumption to increase
the chances the trustees would recover damages).
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rebuttable presumption-one analogous to the CERCLA rebuttable
presumption-to have great evidentiary value. Moreover, departing
from Menefee's analysis of the CERCLA rebuttable presumption, I
propose in Part VI of this Note that FRE 301 does not apply to the
OPA rebuttable presumption and that the policy purposes of the OPA
rebuttable presumption should compel courts to find that it shifts the
burden of persuasion to the responsible parties.
IV.
APPLICATION OF THE DIFFERENT PRESUMPTION THEORIES TO
THE OPA REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
This Part illustrates how the different presumption theories previ-
ously discussed apply to the OPA rebuttable presumption. 06
Suppose that in a federal district jury trial on the issue of NRD
resulting from an oil spill, the trustees present evidence that: (1)
There is a rebuttable presumption under the OPA in favor of the
trustees' NRD assessment and determinations; (2) The trustees com-
plied with NOAA's regulations in assessing damages (for example,
they met the Final Rule's validity-and-reliability standard and followed
the procedure for involving responsible parties in assessment activi-
ties); (3) The trustees' field studies indicated that 250 acres of rocky
intertidal habitats suffered loss of service due to exposure to oil; and
(4) The trustees' Habitat Equivalency Analysis yielded an appropriate
restoration project for those habitats, under which the restoration cost
is $4,000 per acre or $1 million in total.
A. The Bursting-Bubble Approach
The OPA rebuttable presumption will have minimal weight
under the bursting-bubble approach. Under this approach, the trust-
ees will have met their burden of production in their case-in-chief by
presenting the above evidence. If the responsible parties present any
rebutting evidence (for example, that restoration cost is actually
$3900 per acre instead of $4000 per acre), the presumption that the
trustees came up with the correct damage determination via the
NOAA cooperative-assessment procedure immediately ceases to have
any effect. 07 Thus, the trustees must present evidence above and be-
yond what they elucidated through the NOAA cooperative-assessment
procedure (to show that restoration cost is actually $4000) in order to
avoid a directed verdict in favor of the responsible parties on the is-
106 Because of the similarity in language and statutory structure between the OPA and
CERCLA rebuttable presumptions, the analysis here follows the same theoretical structure
Mark Menefee used to explore the burden-shifting effects of the CERCLA rebuttable pre-
sumption. See Menefee, supra note 104, at 15,060-63.
107 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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sue. Assuming that the OPA rebuttable presumption, like the CER-
CLA rebuttable presumption, applies to any determination by the
trustees, 108 it is likely that a court will find that only the final NRD
assessment, that is, the restoration cost, has been burst. All of the
lesser determinations (which make up the final NRD assessment) thus
enjoy the rebuttable presumption, which should not burst and must
be individually rebutted. On the other hand, if the responsible par-
ties present no rebutting evidence, the OPA rebuttable presumption
remains, and the trustees are entitled to a directed verdict on the
issue.
Whether it is a jury or bench trial, the OPA rebuttable presump-
tion will likely have the same effects under the bursting-bubble ap-
proach. If the responsible parties present rebutting evidence, the
judge or fact finder will treat the OPA rebuttable presumption as non-
existent, and the trustees must persuade the fact finder by the weight
of the evidence 09 that their NRD determinations are correct. If the
opposing party presents no rebutting evidence, the judge will find in
favor of the trustees' NRD determinations.
B. The Morgan-McCormick Approach
The Morgan-McCormick approach, like NOAA's, effectuates the
full "force and effect" of the OPA rebuttable presumption.o10 Under
this approach, even if the responsible parties present some rebutting
evidence, the OPA presumption does not simply vanish."' The trust-
ees upon meeting their burden of production will either: (a) have a
directed verdict in their favor on the $1 million damage determina-
tion unless the responsible parties present enough evidence to reason-
ably prove the nonexistence of the presumed fact (i.e., the trustees' $1
million total damage determination is incorrect), or (b) have the
judge issue a mandatory jury instruction that the jury could find con-
trary to the responsible parties' rebutting evidence. In the example
above, scenario (a) illustrates the shifting of both the burden of pro-
duction and persuasion; it is essentially the NOAA interpretation of
the OPA rebuttable presumption.112 Whether the court follows scena-
rio (a) or (b), however, the result is that the OPA rebuttable presump-
108 In United States v. Asarco, Nos. 96-cv-0122, 91-c-342, 1998 WL 1799392, at *2-3 (D.
Idaho), defendant Arsaco argued that upon introduction of rebuttal evidence, that evi-
dence could be used to rebut the entire assessment process, notjust the final results of the
assessment. The court agreed.
109 Presumably the standard of proof here, as a civil case, is the preponderance of
evidence.
110 See 33 U.S.C. § 2706 (e) (2) (2006).
111 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
112 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 443 (Jan. 5, 1996)
(codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
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tion operates in its full force and the trustees' recovery claim has a
greater chance of success.
C. FRE 301
While application of FRE 301, assuming that it applies, would give
the OPA rebuttable presumption slightly greater "force and effect"
than the bursting-bubble approach, the Rule would still significantly
limit the weight of the OPA rebuttable presumption. Under FRE 301,
the trustees have met their burden of production on the issue by
presenting the above evidence. Even if the responsible parties do not
present rebutting evidence after the trustees rest, however, the trust-
ees are not entitled to a directed verdict in favor of their damage de-
termination under FRE 301. A court following the "intermediate"
approach to presumptions would read FRE 301 to entitle the trustees
only to the instruction that the jury may presume the existence of the
asserted fact (i.e., the total cost for restoring 250 acres of rocky inter-
tidal habitats is $1 million, or 250 multiplied by $4000).113 FRE 301
does not have a mandatory effect on the jury; it does not require that
the jury must presume the correctness of the trustees' $1 million deter-
mination. 114 To receive a directed verdict in their favor, the trustees
must still persuade the jury that the number of injured acres of rocky
intertidal habitats that their field studies produced, as well as the res-
toration costs that their Habitat Equivalency Analysis calculated, is
credible evidence supporting the $1 million damage determination.
In contrast, under both the bursting-bubble approach and the Mor-
gan-McCormick approach, absent rebuttal evidence, the trustees
would be entitled to a directed verdict in their favor on the issue.
If the responsible parties present some rebutting evidence (for
example, evidence that their own surveys indicated injuries to only
100 instead of 250 acres of rocky intertidal habitats), the $1 million
damage determination presumption in favor of the trustees does not
disappear or "burst" completely under FRE 301. Because FRE 301
takes the "intermediate" approach, the presumption still has eviden-
tiary weight under the Rule and will go to the jury." 5 The jury, how-
ever, is no longer instructed that it may presume that the trustees' $1
million damage determination is correct, only that it may infer such
correctness.' 16 Because an inference is defined as a deduction based
on the common rules of reasoning and logic, rather than a mandatory
assumption dictated by the rules of law,117 this means that the jury
113 See Menefee, supra note 104, at 15,062-63.
114 See id.
115 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 63, at 541, 544-54.
116 See id. at 344.
117 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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does not have to assume that the trustees' NRD determinations are
correct. Instead, they may use their own power of logic and reasoning
to determine whether they believe or disbelieve the trustees on this
issue. Thus, it is likely that if the evidence presented to a juror were:
(a) the trustees' determination that 250 acres of rocky intertidal habi-
tats were injured, (b) the responsible parties' rebuttal that only 100
acres were injured, and (c) the assumption that the OPA rebuttable
presumption exists, then the juror would probably use the existence
of the OPA rebuttable presumption as one piece of evidence militat-
ing against the responsible parties' 100-acre determination that is to
be weighed against other evidence. Furthermore, as the presumption
has no mandatory effect on the jury under FRE 301, the judge has the
discretion to give this instruction.""s
In sum, while FRE 301 gives the OPA rebuttable presumption
slightly greater "force and effect" than the bursting-bubble approach,
it still significantly limits the legal weight of this presumption as an
"Act of Congress." Under FRE 301, the OPA rebuttable presump-
tion's most powerful effect, achieved when the responsible parties pre-
sent no rebutting evidence, is to entitle the trustees to a jury
instruction that the jury may (rather than must) presume the correct-
ness of the trustees' damage determinations. In other words, even
without any rebutting evidence and even where trustees conducted
their NRD assessment in compliance with NOAA's regulations, the
jury can still question the trustees' assessment and determinations.' 19
DISCUSSION
V.
COURTS SHOULD ADOPT NOAA's INTERPRETATION OF THE
OPA REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
NOAA states that it "interprets" the OPA rebuttable presumption
"to mean that the responsible parties have the burdens of presenting
alternative evidence on damages and of persuading the fact finder
that the damages presented by the trustees are not an appropriate
measure of damages."1 20 That is, in NOAA's view, the rebuttable pre-
sumption shifts the burden of production and the burden of persua-
sion to the responsible parties once the trustees demonstrate that
their NRD assessment procedure complies with the Final Rule. As dis-
cussed in Part IV, application of either FRE 301 or the bursting-bub-
118 See Menefee, supra note 104, at 15,063.
119 Cf Menefee, supra note 104 (arguing that, assuming FRE 301 applies, the CERCLA
presumption should only shift the burden of coming forward with evidence to the defen-
dant and should leave the burden of persuasion on the government plaintiffs).
120 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 443 (Jan. 5, 1996) (codi-
fied at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
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ble approach would likely limit the burden-shifting effects of the OPA
rebuttable presumption. Here, I argue that Congress adopted the
OPA rebuttable presumption for substantive policy goals, one of
which is to give trustees a powerful litigation advantage so as to maxi-
mize their chance of fully and promptly recovering compensation for
the injuries that oil spills inflict on natural resources. Allowing com-
mon-law constraints like the bursting-bubble approach and FRE 301
to limit the OPA rebuttable presumption's burden-shifting effects
would undermine these goals. Thus, assuming that a court would not
defer to NOAA's interpretation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,121 it should still adopt NOAA's construc-
tion because doing so is reasonable and consistent with Congress's
purposes for adopting the OPA rebuttable presumption. Without this
interpretation, a key incentive for parties to engage in cooperative
NRD assessment and the opportunity for prompt and economically
efficient assessment that Congress sought to create by enacting the
OPA would be lost.
A. The OPA Rebuttable Presumption's Statutory Purposes
In contrast to administrative bodies, legislative bodies may "adopt
presumptions for policy reasons."122 While the OPA does not expli-
cate which policy purposes the rebuttable presumption serves, the
structure and legislative history of the Act, set forth in section 1006(e)
and titled "Natural Damage Assessment Regulations," show that Con-
gress adopted this rebuttable presumption primarily for three substan-
tive policy purposes.123
1. Favoring Trustee NRD Recovery
Congress enacted the OPA in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
of March 1989 as a comprehensive scheme to consolidate and im-
prove existing federal liability laws for hazardous releases, such as
CERCLA and the Clean Water Act. 124 In fact, it was originally titled "a
[b] ill [t]o consolidate and improve [fiederal laws providing compen-
sation and establishing liability for oil spills."12 5 By adopting OPA sec-
tion 1006, which seeks to "ensure [ ] that Federal agencies, States, and
citizens are compensated for . . . damages from oilspills" caused by
responsible parties, and by subjecting responsible parties to strict lia-
bility, Congress made clear its intent to favor the trustees' claims for
121 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
122 Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Dep't of Transp., 105 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
123 See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e) (2006).
124 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
125 S. 686, 101st Cong. (1989).
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oil-spill damage recovery.126 This intent was apparent during floor de-
bate in the Senate, where members expressed their approval of vari-
ous state "unlimited liability" schemes for oil spills and their
willingness to exact "heavy damages" from responsible parties to dis-
courage them from "walk [ing] away from the mess
they .. . created." 27 To accomplish this, Congress directed NOAA to
promulgate "regulations [that] should provide for full and prompt
compensation of all natural resources."128 Given such legislative
goals, it follows that Congress adopted the OPA rebuttable presump-
tion as a mechanism to make it easier for trustees to establish oil-spill
liability and to recover damages against responsible parties. 29 Any
judicial construction that would render the presumption incapable of
performing this function is contrary to legislative intent.
2. Encouraging the Use of "Accurate and Defensible" Assessment
Methods
The legislative history of the rebuttable presumption accorded to
NRD assessments and determinations by trustees under subsection
107(f) (2) (C) of CERCLA is also instructive in determining congres-
sional intent for the OPA rebuttable presumption. It reinforces the
idea that Congress adopted the OPA presumption to encourage trust-
ees to use assessment procedures that meet the standards set by
NOAA, a federal agency with expertise in NRD assessment.
Congress modeled the OPA provision for NRD liability after a
similar provision under CERCLA. Indeed, the structure and statutory
language of the two statutes' respective NRD liability provisions, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (CERCLA) and 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (OPA),
are virtually identical. 130 Moreover, it was under subsection
107(f) (2) (C) of CERCLA that Congress first introduced the concept
of according a rebuttable presumption to NRD assessments and deter-
minations made by trustees. 31 Subsection 107(f) (2) (C) provides:
"Any determination or assessment of damages to natural re-
sources ... made by a Federal or State trustee in accordance with the
regulations promulgated under section 9651 (c) of this title shall have
the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trus-
126 See 135 CONG. REc. 18,285, 18,287 (August 3, 1989).
127 Id.
128 See id. at 18,288.
129 Cf Anderson, supra note 66, at 437 (arguing that Congress adopted the analogous
CERC[A rebuttable presumption to "give the trustees a better chance of prevailing in cases
involving difficult-to-prove ecological damage"); Elbaum, supra note 105, at 386 (arguing
that Congress adopted the CERCIA rebuttable presumption "to ease the trustee's task by
denominating the assessment record as prima facie proof of damages and thereby increas-
ing the likelihood that the trustee would recover").
130 See discussion supra note 15.
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2) (C) (2006).
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tee in any administrative or judicial proceeding . . . ."132 This lan-
guage is repeated almost verbatim in the provision setting forth the
OPA rebuttable presumption.' 3 3
During debate over the CERCLA rebuttable presumption, the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works expressed their
view that "[t]he principal hindrance to attaining [an "improved,
fair[,] and expeditious mechanism" for dealing with NRD] was the
absence of a standardized system for assessing such damage which is
efficient as to both time and cost."13 4 The Committee further stated
that one aim of CERCLA was to promote "accurate and defensible
assessments," and that such assessments would have "the evidentiary
status of a rebuttable presumption accorded to the results when the
protocols are followed." 135 When Congress enacted the OPA in 1990,
it transplanted this exact statutory scheme (i.e., directing an agency
with NRD expertise to develop an assessment procedure for trustees
to use and then rewarding trustees with a rebuttable presumption for
their compliance) into section 1006 of that statute. It is thus apparent
that, as under CERCLA, Congress relied on and adopted a rebuttable
presumption when it enacted the OPA in order to encourage the use
of assessment procedures that it deemed reliable and trustworthy.
Any construction that renders the OPA presumption incapable of per-
forming this function is contrary to legislative intent.
3. Discouraging Litigation
In addition to Congress's express emphasis on prompt resolution
of NRD recovery claims,'36 the OPA's overarching statutory scheme
supports Congress's intention to minimize delays in restoration activi-
ties by discouraging litigation. By requiring trustees to consider and
reflect in their restoration plans on the input of the public and re-
sponsible parties under section 1006(c) (5) of the OPA, Congress in-
tended that an open assessment-and-planning process would facilitate
settlement.'3 7 By establishing the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and
making it available to trustees for NRD in cases where responsible par-
ties fail to settle or deny liability, Congress made clear that its end goal
is not litigation but rather prompt restoration and compensation. In
this context, the OPA rebuttable presumption is clearly another
means for Congress to facilitate settlement of such recovery claims
while discouraging costly litigation that inevitably delays restoration.
132 Id.
133 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e) (2).
134 S. REP. No. 96-848 at 85 (1980).
135 Id. at 85-86.
136 See generally supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
137 See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c) (5); Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg.
440, 442 (Jan. 5, 1996) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
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Indeed, by delegating to NOAA under section 1006(e) of the OPA
both the power to promulgate regulations that require trustees to un-
dertake cooperative NRD assessment activities with responsible parties
and to condition the availability of the OPA rebuttable presumption
on such cooperation, Congress's intention was two-fold: on the one
hand, for trustees to quickly resolve their NRD recovery claims, and
on the other hand, to warn responsible parties that if they litigate
without considering settlement or without participating in the NOAA
cooperative-assessment process, the trustees would enjoy a significant
litigation advantage over them by way of the rebuttable presumption.
Thus, any construction that diminishes the strength of the OPA rebut-
table presumption would undercut this legislative goal.
B. NOAA's Interpretation Is Consistent with the OPA's Goals
Given the many policy goals motivating its adoption of the OPA
rebuttable presumption, Congress could not have intended for the
presumption to have little practical effect. NOAA's interpretation,
which gives the presumption its full "force and effect," is consistent
with Congress's intent. With respect to Congress's goal of favoring
the trustees' NRD recovery claims, NOAA's interpretation makes it
easier for trustees to establish liability against responsible parties by
placing on the responsible parties both the burden of producing re-
butting evidence and the burden of persuading the jury of the incor-
rectness of the trustees' assessment and determinations. Because the
trustees' determinations are backed by an administrative procedure
developed by NOAA-an agency with specialized expertise in NRD
assessment-and because the Final Rule gives responsible parties
meaningful opportunities to actively participate in the assessment pro-
cess, this scheme is consistent with the policy favoring accurate and
defensible NRD assessment methods. Finally, with respect to Con-
gress's goals of discouraging litigation and inducing trustees to com-
ply with NOAA's assessment procedures, the OPA rebuttable
presumption would have few practical effects if it did no more than
shift the burden of production. From the trustees' perspective, if the
only consequence of the rebuttable presumption is to shift the burden
of production, compliance with NOAA's cooperative assessment pro-
cedure might even waste the trustees' time and resources, risk re-
vealing to responsible parties information that might hurt the trustees
if the matter went to trial, or force them to give up positions they
would otherwise maintain. From the responsible parties' perspective,
cooperation with the trustees presents, among other things, the risk
that their involvement may improve the quality of the assessment and
make it harder to challenge later in litigation. Thus, only the pros-
pect of losing a powerful litigation advantage would induce the trust-
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ees to comply with NOAA's assessment procedure; conversely, only
the threat that the trustees will enjoy a litigation advantage by way of a
powerful rebuttable presumption would induce responsible parties to
participate in NOAA's assessment procedure. In recognizing this real-
ity by according the OPA rebuttable presumption its full "force and
effect," NOAA strikes an appropriate balance between practical con-
siderations and Congress's policy goals.
C. Chevron Deference?
Although NOAA's interpretation of the OPA rebuttable presump-
tion is consistent with legislative intent, the suggestion that courts de-
fer to NOAA's resolution of this statutory ambiguity is nevertheless
discomforting and worth addressing. In Chevron, the Supreme Court
established that " [i] f ... Congress has not directly addressed the pre-
cise question at issue," courts should defer to reasonable administra-
tive interpretations of law.s38 This principle is applied using a two-
step analysis: first, courts must ask whether Congress has left a statu-
tory ambiguity for the relevant agency to resolve; and second, if a stat-
utory ambiguity exists, courts must defer to the agency's reasonable
interpretation of the ambiguity.139 Here, I point out that even with-
out deciding the questions of statutory ambiguity and reasonableness,
separation-of-powers concerns might lead courts to find that the Chev-
ron framework does not apply and hence to deny NOAA the defer-
ence it would want.
1. The Force of Law
The Supreme Court in Chevron did not instruct the lower courts
to apply its two-step analysis every time they review a statutory inter-
pretation made by an agency. Rather, Chevron applies only to an
138 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071,
2074 (1990) ("The Chevron principle means that in the face of ambiguity, agency interpre-
tations will prevail so long as they are 'reasonable.' ").
139 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 ("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the ques-
tion whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . . If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute .... If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a spe-
cific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given control-
ling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a




agency's interpretation of a "statute which it administers"140-in other
words, a statute through which Congress has given the agency
rulemaking and implementation power. This makes sense because, as
Cass Sunstein observed, "the legislative grant of rulemaking power im-
plicitly carries with it the grant of authority to interpret ambiguities in
the law that the agency is entrusted with administering."'41 In United
States v. Mead Corp.,1 4 2 the Supreme Court refined this precondition
by holding that Chevron applies only "when it appears that [1] Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carry-
ing the force of law, and that [2] the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."143 Al-
though the Court did not say in Mead what constitutes the "force of
law," its decision a year earlier in Christensen v. Harris County suggested
that legislative rules that have gone through the notice-and-comment
process would qualify. 144
NOAA's interpretation of the OPA rebuttable presumption seems
to satisfy the first Mead prerequisite for application of the Chevron
framework. To achieve its goal of enabling public trustees to recover
NRD from oil spills under the OPA, Congress not only expressly di-
rected NOAA to promulgate regulations that govern the process of
assessing such damages but also encouraged trustees to comply with
these regulations by giving any assessments they made in accordance
with such regulations the advantage of a rebuttable presumption.
Under this statutory scheme, the OPA rebuttable presumption is more
than a question of law; it is a policy mechanism central to NOAA's
enforcement power over NRD assessments. Thus, NOAA's interpreta-
tion of the rebuttable presumption, which it has adopted as part of its
NRD assessment regulations and which has gone through the notice-
and-comment process,' 45 meets Mead's "force of law" prong.
2. Separation of Powers
Chevron deference, however, is not likely because NOAA's inter-
pretation arguably fails the second prong of Mead, which requires that
the "agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
140 See id. at 842.
141 Sunstein, supra note 138, at 2093.
142 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
143 See id. at 226-27.
144 See 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Here ... we confront an interpretation contained in
an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters . . . do not
warrant Chevron-style deference.").
145 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 440 (Jan. 5, 1996)
(codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990) (outlining the notice-and-comment process undertaken
before promulgating the Final Rule).
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exercise of that authority."146 More specifically, one can argue that
although Congress gave NOAA power to promulgate NRD assessment
regulations, this power does not include the authority to decide the
effect of an evidentiary rule such as the OPA rebuttable presumption.
Rather, given the established rule that it is judges who "say what the
law is"14 7 and who remain "the final authorities on issues of statutory
construction," 48 this authority belongs to the judiciary. Since Con-
gress itself does not have the power to give NOAA authority to decide
the legal effect of the OPA rebuttable presumption without violating
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, 49 NOAA's interpretation of
the OPA rebuttable presumption could not have been "promulgated
in the exercise of [its] authority" to put forward NRD assessment
regulations.15 0
In sum, while the Mead standard will likely lead courts to deny
NOAA the Chevron deference it would want for its interpretation of
the OPA rebuttable presumption, courts should nevertheless adopt
NOAA's interpretation in order to effectuate the OPA's statutory
goals.
VI.
FRE 301 DOES NOT AND SHOULD NOT GovERN THE
EFFECTS OF THE OPA REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
While NOAA's interpretation of the OPA rebuttable presumption
would accord the presumption its full "force and effect," FRE 301, if
applicable, would significantly limit whatever litigation advantage that
Congress intended to confer on trustees in creating the presump-
tion.151 This result is not necessary. That is, courts need not apply
FRE 301 to the OPA rebuttable presumption for the following
reasons.
A. The OPA Rebuttable Presumption Falls Under FRE 301's
"Act of Congress" Exception
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally apply to civil claims
brought in federal district courts.15 2 Recognizing that Congress may
choose to give different effects to a presumption depending on its
146 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
147 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
148 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968).
149 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court. . . ").
150 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
151 See supra Part IV.C.
152 See FED. R. EVID. 301.
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legislative goals, 153 however, FRE 301 provides an exception for pre-
sumptions in connection with civil actions and proceedings "otherwise
provided for by Act of Congress."15 4 Because the OPA rebuttable pre-
sumption is a statutory presumption, expressly created by Congress
and not by judges or an administrative agency, it is an "Act of Con-
gress" presumption, and FRE 301 thus does not control its burden-
shifting effects. 155 While the precise "force and effect" of the OPA
rebuttable presumption is not explicated by the statute, the plain lan-
guage of FRE 301 is broad enough to exempt statutory presumptions
like the OPA rebuttable presumption from the operation of the Rule.
Any other reading would be contrary to congressional intent.
B. Had Congress Intended for FRE 301 to Govern the Effects of
the OPA Rebuttable Presumption It Would Have Said So
There is no reference to FRE 301 anywhere in the OPA. Given
that FRE 301 had long been in existence when the OPA was enacted,
Congress must have been aware of its potential weakening effects on
the OPA rebuttable presumption. Furthermore, Congress's past prac-
tice with respect to the NRD rebuttable presumption under CERCLA
suggests that had Congress intended for FRE 301 to govern the effects
of the OPA rebuttable presumption, it would have at least mentioned
the Rule. Indeed, when the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee considered the "causation presumption" 56 found in the
proposed personal injury provisions of S. 1480-the 1979 Senate Bill
"that formed the foundation of CERCLA"1 7-it did not shy away
from discussing the effects of FRE 301. In particular, section
4(c) (3) (A) of S. 1480 established a presumption that a claimant's ex-
posure to a hazardous substance caused or significantly contributed to
the claimant's injury or disease.158 Anticipating the FRE 301 issue,
section 4(c) (3) (B) of S. 1480 then went on to clarify that the causa-
tion presumption "affects only the burden of going forward with the
153 See Gen. Elec. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("[L]egislative bodies, unlike administrative bodies, are 'free to adopt presumptions for
policy reasons."' (quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Dep't of Transp., 105 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C.
Cir. 1997))). See generally Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1981) (discussing Con-
gress's power to prescribe standards of proof).
154 See FED. R. EVID. 301.
155 SeeAla. By-Prod. Corp. v. Killingsworth, 733 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that FRE 301 does not apply because the regulation requires an opposing party to
"'establish' the rebutting factor" and that consequently the Act of Congress exception ap-
plies); cf Donnelly Corp. v. Gentex Corp., 918 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
("Rule 301 does not technically dictate the effect of this presumption since this is an 'Act of
Congress' presumption which is outside the scope of Rule 301.").
156 See Menefee, supra note 104, at 15,061 n.36.
157 CAROLE STERN SWITZER & PETER GRAY, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITv Acr (SUPERFUND) 7 (2d ed. 2008).
158 See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 114 (1980) (supplemental views of Sen. Stafford).
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presentation of the case. Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the
burden of proof which shall remain with the claimant in accordance
with rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."159 As Menefee noted,
however, the personal injury provisions of S. 1480 and the "causation
presumption" were not included in the final enactment of CER-
CLA.160 In contrast, Congress retained the CERCLA natural resource
damage rebuttable presumption, and significantly, without accompa-
nying reference to FRE 301.161 Had the FRE 301 issue never surfaced
at all during CERCLA's legislative history, then one could plausibly
view the statutory silence regarding the Rule's effect on the CERCLA
NRD rebuttable presumption as a mere oversight. However, the fact
that Congress considered language regarding the effects of FRE 301
but then did not include it in the final enactment of CERCLA suggests
that it did not affirmatively intend for FRE 301 to govern the CERCLA
NRD rebuttable presumption. Thus, insofar as the OPA NRD rebutta-
ble presumption is analogous to the CERCLA NRD rebuttable pre-
sumption, 16 2 legislative history reinforces the proposition that had
Congress intended for FRE 301 to operate on the OPA rebuttable pre-
sumption it would have provided so.
C. FRE 301 Undercuts Congress's Purposes for the OPA
Rebuttable Presumption
In adopting the OPA, Congress intended that the rebuttable pre-
sumption it provided, exercised to its full "force and effect," would
favor the trustees' claims for NRD recovery.' 63 To facilitate cost-effec-
tive and prompt resolution of such claims, Congress intended that the
rebuttable presumption would encourage trustees to use NRD assess-
ment methods that meet NOAA's standards and procedures. Implic-
itly Congress assumed that the rebuttable presumption would have
evidentiary weight great enough to induce the trustees and responsi-
ble parties to promptly and cooperatively undertake restoration activi-
ties instead of litigating. Even though FRE 301 does not allow the
OPA rebuttable presumption to disappear upon rebutting evidence,
in this policy context, it still significantly weakens the presumption,
contrary to legislative intent. As discussed in Parts II.C and III.C
above, FRE 301 only entitles the trustees to ajury instruction that the
jury may (rather than must) presume the correctness of the trustees'
damage determinations even where the trustees can show that their
159 Id.
160 See Menefee, supra note 104, at 15,062 n.36.
161 See id.
162 See supra Part V.A.2 for a discussion of how the OPA NRD rebuttable presumption
was modeled after the CERCLA NRD rebuttable presumption regarding.
163 See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
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NRD assessments and determinations were in perfect compliance with
NOAA's regulations. If the responsible parties presentjust a quantum
of rebutting evidence, FRE 301 operates to leave it at the discretion of
judges to keep the jury ignorant of the existence of the OPA rebutta-
ble presumption. Such results are contrary to Congress's intent; they
afford the trustees little litigation advantage, allow responsible parties
the opportunity to question NRD determinations derived from the
very assessment procedure in which they participated, and permit the
jury to second-guess determinations that Congress intended for trust-
ees to make and for NOAA to regulate.
Finally, "[i] t is a basic rule of statutory construction 'that one pro-
vision should not be interpreted in a way which is internally contradic-
tory or that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent
or meaningless.' "164 If the OPA rebuttable presumption, found in
section 1006 (e) (2) of the Act, is read to be governed by FRE 301, the
effect of the preceding section 1006(e) (1) of the Act would be signifi-
cantly limited. Congress adopted section 1006(e) (1) to delegate the
power of regulating NRD assessments to NOAA, which includes the
power to induce trustees to engage in cooperative-assessment activities
with responsible parties. Yet, the only penalty Congress provided for
noncompliance with these regulations is the inability to enjoy
whatever litigation advantage the rebuttable presumption might offer.
If one construes that presumption to shift only the burden of produc-
tion under FRE 301, trustees will have little or no incentive to comply
with, for example, NOAA's administrative procedure for cooperative
assessment. Thus, although OPA section 1006(e) (1) purports to en-
able NOAA to promulgate NRD assessment regulations, and to penal-
ize noncompliance with the unavailability of the rebuttable
presumption in OPA section 1006(e) (2), the operation of FRE 301
would significantly limit any legal weight this presumption may have
and thus render the preceding section 1006(e) (1) virtually
meaningless.
VII.
APPLICATION OF THE "BURSTING-BUBBLE" APPROACH WOULD
RENDER THE OPA REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION TOOTHLESS
As FRE 301 would likely operate to significantly limit whatever
litigation advantage Congress intended the OPA rebuttable presump-
tion to offer trustees, so too would the bursting-bubble approach. As
discussed in Part IV.A, under the bursting-bubble approach, the OPA
rebuttable presumption disappears upon the presentation of any re-
164 United States v. Powell, 6 F.3d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hughes Air Corp.
v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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butting evidence. Because oil-spill NRD recovery suits usually involve
well-funded corporate defendants who can always provide the court
with some rebutting evidence, this means that the trustees' NRD deter-
minations, despite having met NOAA's standard of reliability and va-
lidity and the Agency's cooperative-assessment procedure, would carry
minimal weight. This result undercuts Congress's purposes for adopt-
ing the OPA rebuttable presumption and thus should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The OPA provides a comprehensive liability scheme under which
trustees may bring recovery claims for NRD resulting from oil spills
against responsible parties. A critical part of this scheme is the rebut-
table presumption accorded to NRD determinations and assessments
made by public trustees, available upon their compliance with the
standard of validity and reliability and the cooperative-assessment pro-
cedure established by NOAA. While the OPA does not explicate the
precise burden-shifting effects of the rebuttable presumption, NOAA
interprets the presumption to mean that responsible parties must pre-
sent both rebutting evidence and prove that the trustees' NRD deter-
minations are incorrect. Compared to the views of courts and
commentators who follow either the bursting-bubble approach or the
FRE 301 approach to rebuttable presumptions, NOAA's view is aggres-
sive. Considering, however, Congress's intent to leverage the full legal
weight of the OPA rebuttable presumption to favor trustees' claims for
NRD recovery, to induce trustees to use NRD assessment methods that
meet NOAA's standard and procedure, and to discourage litigation,
NOAA's view is consistent with the presumption's statutory purposes.
Given the massive scale of the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico, it is likely that the effort of public trustees to recover
NRD from responsible parties will turn into a long and expensive pro-
cess precisely what Congress sought to prevent when it enacted the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. By adopting NOAA's interpretation of the
OPA rebuttable presumption, courts can help public trustees avoid
this outcome.
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